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Abstract
In this paper, I propose a theory of demographic transition and associated growth
of the stock of knowledge that posits social influence as a key determinant of these
phenomena. Individuals are influenced by ideas developed in the previous generation;
their goal is to maximize their own social influence, that is, the extent to which their
ideas have been used by the next generation. With high communication costs, one’s
ideas are utilized mainly by his/her children, which creates an incentive to have as
many children as possible. With modern communication technologies, one’s ideas can
be used by millions, which makes people invest time into improvement of own ideas
rather than production of children. Even those who can influence only their own
children are induced to have smaller families and improve own ideas, because their
children now have access not only to ideas of parents but also to ideas from the outside
world.
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1 Introduction
The idea that one tries to produce as many offspring as possible, and responds to increase
in resources by increase in fertility, belongs to Thomas Malthus, and was originally applied
only to humans. Only half a century later did Darwin generalize this approach to all living
organisms, from bacteria to primates. Ironically, today this theory appears to be valid for all
life on Earth except humans for whom it was originally designed. In the past two hundred
years, the world underwent a profound demographic transition, and the number of surviving
children produced by humans in most societies is far below their “production possibility
frontier”. The goal of this paper is to offer a theory of demographic transition, building on
recent developments in fields adjacent to Economics, and sticking to the (broadly defined)
Darwinian philosophy. The paragraphs that follow outline the theory in greater detail.
Every agent creates two types of output over his lifetime: ideas and children, each of
which require a time input to produce. Since time is a limited resource, there exists a
tradeoff between the quality of ideas and the number of children produced by an agent.
Production of ideas requires absorption of ideas created by the previous generation; the
goal of agents is to maximize their social influence, that is, the extent to which their own
ideas have been absorbed by the next generation. Higher-quality ideas are absorbed more
intensively, which creates an incentive to spend more time on development of ideas and have
fewer children. Having more children, however, increases the number of people in the next
generation utilizing one’s ideas, which creates incentives to have more children and spend
less time on development of ideas.
In traditional societies, non-relatives are isolated from each other, and children absorb
ideas of their own parents regardless of the quality of these ideas. This creates incentives
for parents to save time on development of ideas and have as many children as possible. In
modern societies, learning from non-parents (and therefore teaching non-children) is nearly
as easy as learning from parents, which makes demand for one’s ideas more elastic with
respect to their quality and induces people to spend more time on development of their
own ideas and thus have fewer children. In an extension of the model, I show that fertility
declines even when people cannot influence the outside world themselves, but their children
are influenced by the outside world. Too fertile, and therefore too uneducated, parents will
not be able to influence even their own children in the presence of ideological competitors
from the outside world.
The next section discusses the biological foundations of influence-based (rather than
consumption-based) preferences.
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1.1 Influence-based preferences
Beginning about three decades ago, theoretical biologists and anthropologists have outlined
one key difference of the Homo sapiens from all other living species – their unprecedented
ability to imitate each other’s behavior. This ability gives rise to culture, which Boyd and
Richerson [2005] (page 3) define as follows.
Culture is information that people acquire from others by teaching, imitation,
and other forms of social learning. On a scale unknown in any other species,
people acquire skills, beliefs, and values from the people around them, and these
beliefs strongly affect behavior.
It is important that unlike transmission of genes that is always vertical (that is, goes from
parent to child), transmission of culture may be not only vertical but also horizontal, i.e. from
peer to peer. Boyd and Richerson [2005] (Chapter 1.1) argue that the evolutionary purpose
of cultural transmission is that it serves as a “shortcut” for the learners: it allows them
to tremendously accelerate the speed of adaptation to a rapidly changing environment by
imitating the most successful individuals they observe. Henrich and Gil-White [2001] argue
that those who imitate may develop a psychological attachment to those being imitated (the
“role models”), which makes the latter more prestigious, or gives them higher social status.
But in the hunter-gatherer society in which the human psychology has evolved, I argue,
higher social status has been associated with higher genetic fitness, and hence individuals
might have evolved a preference for a higher social influence.
Modern society, however, is very different in many ways from the hunter-gatherer soci-
ety for which human psychology has been designed. In particular, unlike hunter-gatherer
societies in which humans were influenced mainly by parents and close relatives, modern
humans routinely interact with and are influenced by hundreds or thousands of strangers;
they are also influenced by scientists whose ideas they learn at school, and celebrities they
see on television. In other words, with lower costs of communication, increased mobility of
people, and increased urbanization rates, competition for social influence has tremendously
intensified. In this environment, I argue, the preference for social influence may go against
the original purpose of increasing genetic fitness: being influential in the modern environ-
ment means spending a lot of time on development of one’s skills, which leaves less time for
family and children.
The literature in Economics on cultural transmission originates in the late 1990s with the
works of Bisin and Verdier [1998] and Bisin and Verdier [2001]. Like the current paper, they
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emphasize the dichotomy of vertical (from parents to children) and horizontal, or oblique
(between non-relatives) transmission, and also assume that parents derive utility from their
cultural traits being vertically transmitted to children. Bisin et al. [2004] find empirical
evidence of religious parents undertaking costly actions to influence their children to adopt
the same religion.
The assumption made in this paper that individuals are also willing to influence non-
relatives is new, but, as elaborated above, it can be related to large literature on people caring
about own social status, since status goes hand-in-hand with influence. In the formulation
of Henrich and Gil-White [2001], high-status (or prestigious as they label them) individuals
are by definition those who influence the behavior of others. The examples of research on
status-based preferences and their implications include Cole et al. [1992] and Robson [1992].
Unlike the existing literature in Economics that assumes private-consumption-based util-
ity or, at best, mixes private consumption with concern for status and/or altruism towards
children, I entirely exclude consumption from individual utility and assume that utility de-
pends on exerted influence only. In theoretical biology, consumption of food is not viewed
as a final good entering utility, but as an investment into bodily/somatic capital that en-
ables one to pursue the ultimate goal of maximizing one’s genetic fitness in the future. In
human society, additionally, part of consumption can be viewed as increasing one’s social
status/influence; inclusion of consumption into the utility function thus has no theoretical
justification.1 Even Adam Smith, the inspirer of the “Homo economicus” concept, in his
Theory of Moral Sentiments famously argued:
To what purpose is all the toil and bustle of the world?... It is not wealth that
men desire, but the consideration and good opinion that wait upon riches.
Moreover, the desire for higher consumption is not universal as in many societies modesty
and abstention are viewed to be more appropriate, whereas higher social influence and greater
respect are universally desired.
1Robson [2001] justifies inclusion of personal consumption into utility by a bounded rationality argument:
if the amount of consumption is highly correlated with the “true” utility function, but optimization of the
latter is computationally intensive, individuals can maximize a consumption-based utility instead.
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1.2 Related theories of demographic transition
1.2.1 “Influential” theories
The theory of demographic transition developed in this paper is most closely related to that
of Newson et al. [2007] as it identifies the same phenomenon – increased interaction with
non-relatives – as the key driver of demographic transition. The mechanism developed in
Newson et al. [2007], however, is different. Individuals are influenced by close relatives who
encourage them to have more children (the “inclusive fitness” argument, Hamilton [1964]).
In traditional societies, influence from relatives is large and hence fertility is high, while in
modern societies there is no such influence, which results in low fertility. In contrast, the
theory I propose explains low fertility not by lack of influence from relatives, but by presence
of influence from non-relatives. To distinguish between the two theories, one should measure
fertility in families that live in isolation, i.e. exposed to influence of neither relatives nor
non-relatives. If Newson et al. [2007] are right, lack of influence from relatives would result in
modern small families; if the theory I propose is correct, lack of influence from non-relatives
would leave families large. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in preindustrial societies, par-
ents who lived in isolation or near isolation had far more children than modern parents. For
example, the famous Lykov family, which retreated from the Communist oppression into the
Siberian taiga in 1932 and lived for nearly fifty years in full isolation, had four children, three
of which were born during the retreat (Peskov [1994]).
Another related theory of demographic transition is proposed by Blackmore [2000] (pages
139-142). The theory builds on the idea of memes originally proposed by Dawkins [1976].
The fact that humans can get influenced by each other’s ideas gives rise to memes, or viruses
of the mind, that alter human behavior so as to spread themselves into more and more brains.
In traditional societies with isolated from each other communities, the spread of memes is
limited, and the standard Darwinian desire to produce as many surviving children as possible
dominates. In the modern world, low costs of communication amplify the role of memes,
which induce their host humans to spend more time on spreading themselves, leaving less
time for physical reproduction. This approach, however, was not accepted by the academic
literature, due to impossibility to verify empirically the existence of the memes.
1.2.2 Socioeconomic theories
In the field of Economics, the existing literature associates the fertility decline with im-
proving socioeconomic conditions of the households. The modern mainstream theories of
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demographic transition build on contributions of Becker [1960] and Becker and Lewis [1973],
the main idea of which is that children should be viewed as a consumption good which re-
quires a time input to enjoy; fertility declines in response to increased earnings opportunities
of household members (mainly women), who switch from enjoying the number of children
to enjoying their “quality”, as well as consumption of other goods. A formal analysis that
relates fertility and income growth was pioneered by Becker et al. [1990] who develop a
multiple equlibria model, in which low-income equilibrium is characterized by low return
to human capital which results in high fertility and zero per-capita income growth, while a
high-income equilibrium is associated with high return to human capital, low fertility, and
rapid growth. More recent contributions in this stream of literature include Galor and Weil
[1996] who argue that technological progress, which has diminished the role of muscle power
and increased the role of brainpower, increased the economic opportunities of women and
thus made them substitute children for consumption; Galor and Weil [2000] build a more
accurate model of demographic transition in which fertility first rises and then declines in
response to income growth, which is consistent with the European historic trend.
Another popular in Economics explanation of declining fertility is the “old age security
hypothesis” by Caldwell [1976] who argues that when social security is poor, parents have
many children, expecting that children will support them in their old age; improved social
security reduces the need for children and therefore results in a lower fertility.
Finally, a third popular stream of literature attributes declining fertility to a declining
child mortality rate: if parents are risk averse, they respond to better health services by
sharply reducing the number of births, which results in a smaller number of surviving chil-
dren. Recent examples of this school of thought include Kalemli-Ozcan [2003] and Tamura
[2006].
It seems very plausible that all above mentioned factors of fertility decline – increased re-
turn to human capital (especially that of women), better social security, lower child mortality
– are often associated with increased interaction of individuals with non-relatives, and thus
to increased exposure to outside cultural influence. Therefore, the three above factors may
be correlated with unobserved social influence, rather than affect fertility per se. In section
5, I provide empirical evidence that at least part of fertility decline should be attributed to
the effect of outside cultural influence, rather than to the effect of socioeconomic change.
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2 Model
2.1 Basics
This is an overlapping-generations model, where each generation lives for two periods. Each
generation is labeled by its period of birth, t ∈ {0, 1, . . . }. In each generation, there is a
continuum Gt of individuals. It is assumed that individuals make all their decisions when
young, and enjoy their utility when old. For simplicity, there is no time discounting.
Members of two consecutive generations are linked to each other by parent-child relation-
ship: each child has one parent; the number of children of a parent is endogenous. Formally,
I define a parental operator C : Gt−1 → Gt such that for every i ∈ Gt−1, C(i) is the set of
all children of i.
An individual j ∈ Gt is influenced by (“influence”is rigorously specified in section 2.2)
his parent C−1(j) ∈ Gt−1, as well as by a subset of parents’ contemporaries, or “neighbors”.
To define formally the set of parent’s neighbors, it is convenient to assume that there exists a
spatial allocation of members of a given generation; I assume they are distributed uniformly
on a circle. The density of agents on the circle is constant, so the circle expands with
population growth. There is a metric that measures distance between any two members of
a given generation. For the analysis that follows, for every j ∈ Gt,∀t I define a set N(j)
of neighbors of j’s parent as the set of all i ∈ Gt−1\C−1(j) such that |N(j)| = N and
||i, C−1(j)|| ≤ ||i′, C−1(j)|| for any i ∈ N(j) and i′ ∈ Gt−1\N(j)\C−1(j). I assume that total
population is large enough, so that N ≤ |Gt| for every time period t. I refer to members of
N(j) as non-parents of j.
It is also convenient to define the set of individuals in the next generation who are
influenced by j ∈ Gt. By the influence set S(j) we will denote all such individuals, except
j’s own children C(j). Formally, S(j) is the set of all k ∈ Gt+1 such that j ∈ N(k). Figure
1 illustrates the geography of influence.
The rest of the model is presented in a somewhat unusual order: I first define individual
constraints and then the utility function.
2.2 Constraints
Each individual j ∈ Gt,∀t is endowed with L units of time that can be utilized in two
activities: learning and production of children. I assume that raising each child takes ν units
of parent’s time, so an individual j who has n(j) children and spends x(j) units of time
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Figure 1: An illustration of the geography of influence
learning has the following budget constraint:
x(j) + νn(j) ≤ L (1)
Individuals are allowed to choose non-integer number of children, which can be interpreted
as follows. While the choice of a parent n(j) may be non-integer, the actual number of
children is a multinomial random variable with an expectation of n(j). As defined below,
parents are risk neutral with respect to the number of children, and thus the variance in
the number of children is immaterial: any mean-preserving spread in the distribution of the
number of children does not change parents’ decisions. Also, I assume that the time burden
of raising children depends on expected value n(j), rather than on actual realization.
By assumption, there exists a learning lower bound: x(j) ≥ L > 0. This assumption
reflects the fact early in their life, individuals can only learn and cannot reproduce.
Each individual j ∈ Gt is characterized by the quality q(j) of his idea. In this stylized
model, we assume for simplicity there is only one idea per person, which represents all intel-
lectual legacy produced by that individual over his or her lifetime, and which can be viewed
as an analog of human capital in conventional models of demographic transition. To develop
an idea, j has to absorb, or get influenced by, ideas developed by the previous generation.
This assumption relies on the fact that knowledge accumulation is a social activity; the most
successful ideas “stand on the shoulders of giants” rather than are developed in isolation.
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The parent of j, C−1(j), has a strictly positive and finite influence on the formation of j’s
idea, while each of non-parents N(j) ⊂ Gt−1 has an infinitesimal influence on j. The ag-
gregate influence of non-parents is of the same order of magnitude as the influence of the
parent. Formally,
q(j) =
([
q(C−1(j))y(C−1(j), j)
]σ−1
σ +
∫
i∈N(j)
[q(i)y(i, j)]
σ−1
σ di
) σ
σ−1
(2)
Here y(i, j) ≥ 0 is the influence of i on j; σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between
ideas.2 While q(i) is given for j, the extent to which he is influenced by i, y(i, j), is his
control parameter, and is chosen subject to a time constraint outlined below.
Absorbtion of ideas incurs a time cost per unit of influence. I assume that the time cost of
learning from one’s parent is normalized to unity, while the cost of learning from non-parents
is τ ≥ 1. The latter is the key parameter of interest in this paper: falling costs of learning
from non-parents imply increased outside influence, and affect fertility and accumulation of
knowledge.
The total amount of time spent on learning from all sources must add up to x(j):
y(C−1(j), j) +
∫
i∈N(j)
y(i, j)τdi = x(j) (3)
2.3 Objective function
Individuals derive utility from increasing the share of their ideas in the minds of the next
generation; they place a special emphasis on their own children. The extent to which j’s
child has absorbed his/her ideas has a finite positive weight on j’s utility, while the influence
on each member of S(j) has an infinitesimal weight. The influence on children and the
aggregate influence on those in S(j) are of the same order of magnitude. Formally,
U(j) =
∑
k∈C(j)
y(j, k)
y(j, k) +
∫
j′∈N(k) y(j
′, k)dj′
+
∫
k∈S(j)
y(j, k)
y(C−1(k), k) +
∫
j′∈N(k) y(j
′, k)dj′
dk (4)
2The constant elasticity of substitution function of ideas production was chosen to reflect the fact that
individuals are influenced more by better ideas, and respond smoothly to changes in the quality of ideas.
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2.4 Initial conditions
It is assumed that every individual in the initial generation G0 has n0 children and the
quality of idea of q0.
3 Analysis
3.1 Optimal learning intensities
There are many possible equilibria in the environment described above; I concentrate on the
“focal” equilibria in which individuals are influenced more by better ideas. The Proposition
below shows that this property is recursive: if it is true for the influence of generation t on
generation t+ 1, it is also true for the influence of t− 1 on t.
For the analysis that follows, it is convenient to define the following variable:
E(j) ≡ q(C−1(j))σ−1 +
∫
i∈N(j)
(
q(i)
τ
)σ−1
di (5)
E(j) is the learning environment of individual j: it shows how smart j’s potential teachers
are, and how easy it is to absorb their ideas. By definition, E(j) does not depend on j’s
decisions and is taken by him as given.
Proposition 1 If a better idea q(j) of j ∈ Gt increases his influence on the next generation,
the optimal extent to which he is influenced by i ∈ {C−1(j) ∪N(j)} is
y(i, j) =
x(j)
E(j)
q(i)σ−1τ−σ×I(j /∈C(i)) (6)
where I(·) is the indicator function.
The influence of i on j increases linearly with the overall length of j’s education x(j);
it increases with the quality of i’s idea q(i), and decreases with learning cost τ , if i is a
non-parent. The influence of i also decreases as j’s learning environment E(j) improves.
The intuition of the proof is as follows. If the influence of j on the next generation
increases with the quality of his idea q(j), he is willing to attain the highest possible q(j) for
any given value of his learning time x(j). Therefore, the extent to which j is influenced by
each member of the previous generation can be found by maximizing (2) over y(i, j),∀i ∈
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{C−1(j)∪N(j)} subject to (3). Appendix A shows that the optimal solution to this problem
is given by (6).
From (2) and (6), we can also compute the optimal (highest possible) quality of j’s idea
given his learning time x(j):
q(j) =
x(j)
E(j)
(
q(C−1(j))σ−1 +
∫
i∈N(j)
(
q(i)
τ
)σ−1
di
) σ
σ−1
=
x(j)
E(j)
E(j)
σ
σ−1
= E(j)
1
σ−1x(j) (7)
Using (7), we can rewrite (6) and (5):
y(i, j) =
x(j)
E(j)
E(i)x(i)σ−1τ−σ×I(j /∈C(i)) (8)
E(j) = E(C−1(j))x(C−1(j))σ−1 +
∫
i∈N(j)
E(i)
(
x(i)
τ
)σ−1
di (9)
Using (8) extrapolated one generation forward and canceling out x(k)
E(k)
from the numerators
and denominators of both components, we can rewrite the utility (4) as follows:
U(j) =
∑
k∈C(j)
E(j)x(j)σ−1
E(j)x(j)σ−1 +
∫
j′∈N(k)E(j
′)x(j′)σ−1τ−σdj′
+
∫
k∈S(j)
E(j)x(j)σ−1τ−σ
E(C−1(k))x(C−1(k))σ−1 +
∫
j′∈N(k)E(j
′)x(j′)σ−1τ−σdj′
dk (10)
The next section focuses on the study of the learning choice of a particular individual
j ∈ Gt (henceforth the decision maker), assuming that all other individuals within the same
generation, as well as in other generations, make the same learning choices. To simplify the
exposition of the analysis that follows, additional notations and assumptions are made.
- Since all members of all generations except j ∈ Gt make identical learning choices, I
omit subscripts and denote them by x.
- The learning environment and the quality of ideas are the same for all individuals within
a generation but may change over time; I denote them by Et and qt, respectively.
- To emphasize that the equilibrium decisions depend on a measure of outside influence,
N ≡ Nτ−σ, I display all relevant variables as functions of this parameter.
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- By z I denote a learning choice of the decision maker, by z(x,N) – his best response
to the learning choices of others, given the amount of outside influence N .
- From (1), the expected number of children of the decision maker is L−z
ν
. The expected
number of children of his contemporaries is L−x
ν
. Given that each individual in the
next generation is influenced by N non-parents, the measure of the influence set of the
decision maker (as well as his contemporaries) is |S(j)| = L−x
ν
N .
With new notations, the objective function of the decision maker (10) can be rewritten
as
U(z, x,N) =
L− z
ν
B(z, x,N) +
L− x
ν
H(z, x,N) (11)
where
B(z, x,N) ≡ z
σ−1
zσ−1 +Nxσ−1τ−σ
=
zσ−1
zσ−1 + xσ−1N
(12)
H(z, x,N) ≡ Nz
σ−1τ−σ
xσ−1 +Nxσ−1τ−σ
=
zσ−1N
xσ−1(1 +N)
(13)
Intuitively, B(z, x,N) is the share of the decision maker’s ideas in the minds of his own
children, while H(z, x,N) is a measure of the decision maker’s influence on the minds of
others. Maximization of (11) over z ∈ [L,L] yields the solution to the problem of the
decision maker.
4 Results
4.1 A primer: isolated families
Consider an extreme case in which children can only learn from their parents, that is τ =∞
and N = 0. Then, B(z, x,N) ≡ 1 and H(z, x,N) ≡ 0; maximization of (11) over z yields
the corner solution: z(x) = L. When families cannot communicate with one another, we
end up with a standard Darwinian/Malthusian equilibrium in which parents maximize the
number of children and have the minimal level of education.
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4.2 Symmetric influence
We now focus on a general case in which the outside influence is positive: N > 0. In this
case, the argminimum of utility is z = 0; the argmaximum must be strictly positive. For the
clarity of exposition, I assume that the educational lower bound L is low enough and does
not bind the decision maker, which allows us to ignore it in the analysis that follows. The
first derivative of utility (11) over z is (omitting function arguments)
νUz = (L− z)Bz −B + (L− x)Hz = (L− z)σ − 1
z
B(1−B)−B + (L− x)σ − 1
z
H
= BF + (L− x)σ − 1
z
H (14)
where
F (z, x,N) ≡ (σ − 1)
(
L
z
− 1
)
(1−B(z, x,N))− 1 (15)
At the optimal point z(x,N), the value of (14) must be zero if z(x,N) < L, and nonnegative
if z(x,N) = L.
In (14), the properties of its components are as follows. B(z, x,N) monotonically in-
creases from zero to one as z increases from zero to infinity; F (z, x,N) monotonically de-
creases from infinity to −1 as z increases from zero to L; H(z, x,N) is positive, increasing
and convex in z, hence the second component of (14) is also positive and increasing in z.
Denote by z∗(x,N) the value of z that makes F equal to zero:
F (z∗(x,N), x,N) ≡ 0 (16)
For z ∈ (0, z∗(x,N)], (14) is strictly positive, and therefore the argmaximum of utility must
be searched on (z∗(x,N), L].
The following Lemma is helpful in the analysis that follows.
Lemma 1 1. Function U(z, x,N) has at most two local maxima on z ∈ (0, L] for given
x ∈ (0,∞) and N > 0.
2. Function U(z, x,N) has at most one local maximum on z ∈ (0, L) for given x ∈ (0,∞)
and N > 0 (and therefore the other one, if exists, is at z = L).
3. If
B(L, x,N) ≤ σ
2(σ − 1) (17)
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function U(z, x,N) has only one maximum on z ∈ (0, L], for given x ∈ (0,∞) and
N > 0.
Note that when σ < 2, the condition (17) holds for any values of x and N , because
B(L, x,N) ≤ 1 by definition of B.
The proof of Lemma 1 is contained in Appendix B. Lemma 1 entails the following
Corollary 1 Any point z1 ∈ (0, L) of utility local maximum, for given x and N , is also the
point of global maximum if and only if U(z1, x,N) ≥ U(L, x,N).
We now turn to the central result of this section – characterization of the symmetric
equilibrium, in which the decision maker’s learning best response is equal to the learning
decision of others, that is z(x,N) = x.
Proposition 2 (Symmetric pure strategy equilibrium) The equilibrium learning decision is
x(N) = L
(σ − 1)A(N)
1 + (σ − 1)A(N) (18)
where
A(N) ≡ N
1 +N
+N (19)
if and only if
(σ − 1) log
(
1 +
1
A(N)(σ − 1)
)
< log
(
1 +
1
N
)
(20)
An increasing exposure of individuals to outside influence N , brought about by falling
learning costs τ , increases A(N), thereby increasing the learning time x(N) and decreasing
the family size n(N) = L−x(N)
ν
.
Proof. The expression (18) for the steady state learning time x(N) was derived by set-
ting Uz(x, x,N) equal to zero and solving for x, and therefore the first-order condition of
maximum holds by construction of x. The second derivative of utility can be shown to be
νUzz(x, x,N) = −σ − 1
x
N
A(N)(1 +N)2
[
N +
2 +N
σ − 1
]
< 0 (21)
therefore the second-order condition also holds. By Corollary 1, x(N) refers to the maximum
of utility if U(x(N), x(N), N) ≥ U(L, x(N), N), which is equivalent to (20).
It can be shown that the condition (20) holds for any N if σ < 2, and for any σ if
N > N0 ≈ 34 . Therefore, symmetric pure strategy equilibrium does not exist only when
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Figure 2: The region of existence of the symmetric pure strategy equilibrium (SPSE)
the outside influence N is small and elasticity of substitution between ideas σ is large.
Figure 2 illustrates the set of parameters σ and N in which the equilibrium characterized by
Proposition 2 exists.
Note that A(N) consists of two components, both of which are positively related to N .
The first component reflects the fact that with increasing outside influence, one’s children
are affected by an increasing number of non-parents. To retain influence on his own chil-
dren, one has to study more. The second component is due to the fact that as the outside
influence increases, one gets an opportunity to influence an increasing number of someone
else’s children. To maximize one’s utility, it becomes optimal to reduce the family size and
increase the quality of own idea.
Another parameter of interest is the growth rate of the quality of ideas, which can be
interpreted as the technological growth rate. From (7) and (9),
qt+1
qt
=
(
Et+1
Et
) 1
σ−1
= x(N)
(
1 +Nτ−(σ−1)
) 1
σ−1 (22)
where, to recall, N = Nτ−σ. As the learning cost τ falls, the rate of knowledge growth
accelerates for two reasons. First, with better access to the knowledge of non-parents, agents
are able to learn more given the same learning time.3 Second, falling learning costs induce
people to spend more time on learning x, which also accelerates the rate of improvement of
ideas.
3This result is similar to the famous “love of variety” effect in international trade literature.
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4.3 Equilibrium stability
We next verify that the equilibrium derived in section 4.2 is locally stable. Two concepts of
stability are introduced. Intragenerational stability occurs when a representative individual
responds to a small deviation of everyone else’s learning choice x so that the average moves
back to the original equilibrium. Formally,
dz
dx
(x,N) < 1 (23)
Intergenerational stability occurs when after a small deviation in the learning environment of
j ∈ Gt (holding the learning environments of others in Gt unchanged), learning environments
of j’s successors converge to that of their contemporaries. Formally, the operatorR that maps
the relative learning environment of j, R(j) ≡ E(j)
Et
, into the relative learning environment
of his children, R(C(j)) ≡ E(C(j))
Et+1
, is the contraction mapping in the vicinity of unity:
R(1) = 1 and
∣∣∣∣dRdR (1)
∣∣∣∣ < 1 (24)
The following Proposition establishes both types of stability.
Proposition 3 The symmetric equilibrium characterized in Section 4.2 is intragenerationally
and intergenerationally stable.
The proof is contained in Appendix C.
4.4 The pure effect of outside influence
People living in the province, especially in rural areas, have a very limited ability to influence
the rest of the world; in this respect, they are not very much different from traditional
societies that dominated the world two centuries ago. Nevertheless, demographic transition
has occurred in the province too.
I propose the following explanation of the phenomenon. Agents choose to have fewer
children not only when they face an opportunity to influence non-children, but also when
their children can be influenced by the outside world. In traditional societies, parents are
monopolists in the “ideological market” of their children, and hence have no incentive to
improve the quality of their ideas. In the modern world, children can learn not only from
their parents, but also from many other sources – travelers visiting their community, radio,
television, and finally the Internet. In this environment, a parent of fifteen children, who
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has spent all his life on raising children and thus has little education, will have very little
influence even on his own children: they would choose to learn from television instead. A
rational parent should reduce the family size and acquire more education, in order to be able
to compete with the ideas delivered by the outside world.
In this section, I develop an extension of the model that formalizes the above intuition. I
assume that at the beginning of their lives, all people are randomly divided into two groups
– artists (fraction α of population) and peasants (fraction 1 − α). Formally, the set Gt of
all agents of generation t is partitioned into the subset of artists GAt and peasants G
P
t . As
before, all agents are distributed uniformly on a circle. Given randomness of division into
artists and peasants, agents within each of these groups are also uniformly distributed. Each
agent j ∈ Gt, either artist or peasant, can learn from two sources. First, he can learn from
own parent C−1(j), with the unitary learning cost as before. Second, he can learn from the
mass N of the nearest artists; denote the set of these artists by N(j). The cost of learning
from artists in N(j) is τ ≥ 1. Learning from other individuals is impossible. Note that when
α = 0, we are back to the isolated families scenario analyzed in section 4.1. When α = 1,
we are in the symmetric influence equilibrium analyzed in section 4.2.
I make an additional assumption that artists have no children and spend all their life
developing their ideas. This assumption is motivated by the following several arguments.
First, the main goal of this section is to analyze the effect of artists’ influence on the fertility
decisions of peasants; fertility decisions of artists themselves are of secondary interest. Sec-
ond, when α is small enough, each artist has access to the minds of a large number of people,
and having no children can be shown to be an incentive compatible strategy.4 Third, when
artists have no families, everyone’s parent must be a peasant; therefore, any agent j ∈ Gt,
whether artist or peasant, has the same learning environment E(j) = Et which simplifies
the analysis.
We now proceed to the analysis of learning and fertility decisions made by peasants.
Since they can influence only own children, the second component of their utility (11) is
zero. Since the only outside influence their children face is from artists who learn x = L
units of time, the utility of peasants can be rewritten as
U(z,N) =
(
L− z
ν
)
B(z, L,N) (25)
4Intuitively, the mass of individuals each artist can influence is inversely related to the share of artists
in the population α. When α approaches zero, the slope of the second component of artist’s utility (11)
approaches infinity, which makes the artist maximize the learning time and have no family.
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It is trivial to show that there exists a unique interior maximum of (25), hence the first
derivative of utility must to equal to zero at the optimal point. Modifying (14), we obtain:
νUz(z,N) = B(z, L,N)F (z, L,N) = 0 (26)
Since B is positive for z > 0, we have that F (z, L,N) = 0. The response of peasants to
increase of outside influence N can be computed from the implicit function theorem:
dz(N)
dN
= −
dF (z,L,N)
dN
dF (z,L,N)
dz
From the definition of F (15), it is straightforward to verify that dF (z,L,N)
dN
> 0 and that
dF (z,L,N)
dz
< 0, and therefore peasants respond to increases in outside influence by acquiring
more knowledge z and by reducing the family size L−z
ν
.
5 Outside influence vs. economic change: empirics
Identifying the effect of cultural influence on fertility is difficult because of the lack of credible
measures of cultural influence. In this section, I refer to existing empirical and anecdotal
evidence that can be interpreted as evidence of such an effect, and conduct a cross-country
empirical study of my own that suggests the existence of such influence.
5.1 The effect of television on fertility
A stark example of the effect of outside influence is a recent finding by La Ferrara et al. [2008]
who discover that the arrival of a TV channel broadcasting “soap operas” has a negative
impact on fertility in Brazil. It is hard to think of ways in which “soap operas” could have
improved the return to human capital, or social security, or child survival rate; an increased
outside cultural influence is a better theory.
5.2 Religious isolation and fertility
A good example of the opposite phenomenon – little contact with the outside world and
preserved high fertility – is Amish community in the United States. They voluntarily ab-
stain from modern communication devices such as phones and television, as well as from
modern vehicles and travel opportunities. Such an abstention effectively limits the number
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of people with whom Amish community members can interact, and increase the frequency
of interaction with parents and other close relatives. At the same time, Amish families are
very large. Greksa [2002] estimates [marital] fertility among Old Order Amish at 7.7 chil-
dren per woman, which makes Amish community one of the fastest-growing communities
in the OECD countries. As citizens of the United States, they have access to all economic
opportunities that their non-religious compatriots do; the levels of their education, infant
survival rates, and old age security presumably exceed those of people in the lower income
decile of the US population, who are not known to have exceptionally high fertility rates.
Isolation from the outside influence, rather than economic conditions, appears to be a better
explanation of high Amish fertility.
5.3 The noxious influence of the West
A well-known stylized fact is that fertility in the Eastern European countries declined sharply
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, following political and economic liberalization. For exam-
ple, fertility (births per woman) in Russia fell from 2.22 in 1987 to 1.23 in 1997, almost a
twofold decline in one decade. To my knowledge, there is no formal theory of the determi-
nants of such a sharp decline; economic instability is usually blamed. All socioeconomic the-
ories of demographic transition, however, associate macroeconomic instability with higher,
not lower, fertility. Decreased return to human capital,5 retirement system destroyed by
hyperinflation, and increased infant mortality must have changed fertility in the opposite
direction. Moreover, in a cross-section of countries, fertility decline does not seem to be
closely related to macroeconomic turbulence. Fertility fell sharply in Czech Republic which
has experienced only a mild and short recession; at the same time, there was no change of
fertility trend in Tajikistan after a four-fold decline of per capita GDP. Serbia lived through
a two-fold GDP decline, two civil wars and one war with NATO, which did not alter its
fertility trend. An investigation of another region that lived through large macroeconomic
turbulence in the 1980s and 1990s – Latin America – also does not reveal any relation be-
tween macroeconomic conditions and fertility. Argentina had a period of hyperinflation and
a recession in late-1980s, which had no effect on the fertility trend.
The above mentioned evidence can be summarized as follows: fertility fell in countries
of the former Warsaw pact, i.e. those behind the “iron curtain”, except in countries with
traditional “Oriental” culture like Azerbaijan or Uzbekistan. There was no sharp change in
5E.g. the wages of university professors have notoriously fallen several times below the wages of taxi
drivers, making the return to human capital effectively negative
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fertility in countries outside of the “iron curtain”, e.g. former Yugoslav republics or Latin
American countries, despite comparable macroeconomic turbulence.
These stylized facts can be explained by the “influential” theory of demographic transi-
tion. Prior to political reforms, members of the Warsaw pact were culturally isolated from
the West. Soviet propaganda widely used the term “tletvornoye vliyanie Zapada” (the nox-
ious influence of the West); a considerable effort was made to reduce the “noxious” influence
to a minimum. In the late 1980s, all checks on the “noxious” influence have been removed;
Eastern European countries got flooded by Western culture: music, movies, fashion, and
lifestyles. A sharp increase in the outside cultural influence induced the young people in
countries like Estonia, Russia and Moldova to acquire new types of “human capital” that
would enable them to preserve their social status and influence in their communities; more
time spent on acquisition of new human capital meant less time remaining for family.
There was no change in fertility trends in former Yugoslavia and Latin America, because
these territories were previously open to Western cultural influence, and large macroeco-
nomic changes were not accompanied by large cultural change. There was no change in
fertility trends in former Soviet countries with Oriental culture, because these countries were
not susceptible to Western influence. To explain formally fertility non-response of Oriental
cultures to a sharp rise in the Western influence, one could generalize the model developed
in this paper in the following way. Two types of ideas can be introduced – Western and
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Oriental; the production function of new ideas (2) would be characterized by high elasticity
of substitution between ideas of different types. Then, individuals living in the Orient, sur-
rounded by neighbors with predominantly Oriental ideas, would demand little of Western
ideas; their observed behavior would change little following large changes in the access to
Western ideas.
5.4 Fertility and happiness
The common property of all socioeconomic theories of demographic transition is that they
associate reduced fertility with better economic opportunities or, in the language of under-
graduate Microeconomics, with an expansion of the opportunity set of parents. A corollary
of this assumption is that lower fertility must be accompanied by a higher level of utility.
Increased return to human capital lowers fertility and increases utility. Increased old-age
security lowers fertility and increases utility. Reduced child mortality lowers fertility and
increases utility.
The “influential” theory of demographic transition developed in this paper highlights two
forces that reduce fertility: increased opportunity to influence others, which increases utility,
and increased opportunity of others to influence one’s children, which lowers utility. It is
natural to assume that in the era of mass-media, the second effect dominates for the vast
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majority of people, and hence the “influential” theory of demographic transition predicts
a positive relationship between fertility and the level of utility: increased outside influence
lowers fertility and lowers utility, despite the acceleration of human capital accumulation.
Empirically, the relationship between fertility and utility may be tested by using a mea-
sure of well-being or happiness as a proxy for utility. In the existing literature, Blanchflower
and Oswald [2004] famously discover that the happiness trend in the US and Britain after the
World War II (when fertility was declining) is negative, which is consistent with the theory
of increasing outside influence following the spread of mass-media. Guriev and Zhuravskaya
[2009] document that people in transition countries, especially people over 40 years old, are
abnormally unhappy. This phenomenon, combined with abnormally low fertility in these
countries discussed in section 5.3, can be explained by a sudden increase of the outside cul-
tural influence that has decreased the influence of local community members on each other.
The loss of social influence of older people was especially rapid, because, unlike the young,
they had no opportunity to adjust their family size and absorb newly available influential
ideas to retain own influence.
The relationship between well-being and utility can be tested directly whenever a measure
of well-being is available. The underlying theory is as follows. Suppose the utility of a
representative individual is u(f − ,X, Z) + ν, where f is fertility chosen by the decision
maker, X is 1× nX vector of observed exogenous utility determinants, Z is 1× nZ vector of
unobserved exogenous utility determinants (including outside influence), and , ν are shocks
that are observed by the individual but not by the econometrician, and that are orthogonal
to X and Z.6 The utility is smooth and concave, and therefore results in the unique optimal
fertility level f(x, z)− . By the envelope theorem, therefore, full derivatives of utility with
respect to control variables (that is, the marginal effects of controls on utility) are equal
to the corresponding partial derivatives; the derivative of (optimal) utility with respect to
(optimal) fertility is zero. The utility at the optimal point can therefore be linearized as
follows:7
u(f(X,Z)− ,X, Z) = XαX + ZαZ + ν (27)
while the optimal fertility can be linearized as
f(X,Z) = XβX + ZβZ +  (28)
6We assume unconstrained optimization, hence u can be viewed as the Lagrangian of the corresponding
constrained optimization problem.
7All variables are demeaned for tractability of exposition.
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The unobserved controls Z can be inferred from (27) as
Z = (u−XαX − ν)α−1Z (29)
where α−1Z is 1 × nX vector of inverse elements of αZ . Then, fertility can be rewritten as
follows:
f = X(βX − αXα−1Z βZ) + uα−1Z βZ − να−1Z βZ +  (30)
By regressing f on X and u, we obtain α−1Z βZ as a coefficient for u.
8 If it is positive
and significant, there must exist a element of Z which is changing fertility and utility in the
same direction, which we attribute to the effect of outside cultural influence due to lack of
alternative theories making such a prediction.
I test this prediction by using data from the World Values Survey, which is a globally
representative sociological survey conducted in almost 100 countries of the world, with five
waves spanning the years of 1980-2005. Among other questions, the survey asks its respon-
dents to rate the overall satisfaction with their lives on the scale from 1 to 10, which I use as
a proxy for utility. Although the data on the actual number of children is available, I avoid
using it because actual fertility outcomes may depend on unobserved health shocks which
make an individual simultaneously less fertile and less satisfied with life, which would make
the regression results spurious. Instead, as a measure of fertility I choose the ideal number of
children reported by the respondents. The ideal number of children is, arguably, less related
to idiosyncratic shocks such as health, unemployment, and widowhood, and is more likely
to be an outcome of the overall cultural and socioeconomic environment. There are 166
thousand observations in about 65 countries on all continents in which both life satisfaction
and desired fertility are observed. Table 1 in Appendix reports the results.
At the global level, the effect of utility, as a proxy for unobserved determinants of fertility,
is positive and significant as long as country dummies are included into the regression. This
effect is positive on all continents except Africa, and is significant in America, Asia, and
Europe. In the Pacific (Australia and New Zealand), it is of the same order of magnitude
as on the preceding three continents, but a smaller number of observations do not allow to
judge about its significance. Therefore, we can conclude, the variation of fertility that was
not explained by cross-country differences is more plausibly explained by variation in outside
cultural influence than by variation in socioeconomic conditions.
The fact that without country fixed effects the relationship between fertility and well-
8The estimate of this coefficient is closer to zero than the true value due to error-in-variable ν.
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being is negative can be explained as follows. While low outside influence, all else equal,
results in larger and happier households, high fertility in such territories will reduce the na-
tionwide amount of resources per capita, which lowers utility. With this theory, we are more
likely to observe the positive relationship between well-being and fertility within countries
than across countries.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops an “influential” theory of demographic transition, according to which
the decline of fertility over time occurs due to increased outside cultural influence rather than
due to increased economic opportunities of parents. The objective of parents is to maximize
own cultural influence on own children and on other people. With increased outside influence,
children’s demand for parents’ ideas becomes more sensitive to their quality, which induces
parents to spend more time on education and reduce the amount of time spent on family. It
is difficult to imagine a father of seven children attend a rock concert or play in a rock band;
rock music, almost by definition, is a high-influence entity. Access of people to this kind of
activities should have an effect on fertility choices.
The model developed in this paper, for simplicity, assumes that ideas are unidimensional;
in fact, there may exist a vast array of different types of ideas. Different societies may be
susceptible to different types of ideas, and it may be hard to tell in advance which ideas will
affect a particular society. La Ferrara et al. [2008] discover that fertility in Brazil declines
after the arrival of a particular television channel broadcasting particular types of shows;
the same channel is likely to have little effect on African households. In this light, the
Internet seems to be the best vector of influential ideas, as it allows users to search and find
themselves the ideas that influence them most.
The model developed in this paper predicts that high outside influence, besides reducing
fertility, makes people worse off. However, reduced fertility may have a positive externality
on other families by increasing the amount of resources per capita. Therefore, the aggregate
effect of increased outside influence on well-being may be positive. The empirical part of
the paper confirms that within countries, the relationship between fertility and a measure of
utility is positive, while across countries it is negative.
25
References
Gary S. Becker. An economic analysis of fertility. In Demographic and Economic Change in
Developed Countries, pages 225 – 256. UMI, 1960.
Gary S. Becker and H. Gregg Lewis. On the interaction between the quantity and quality
of children. The Journal of Political Economy, 81(2):S279–S288, 1973.
Gary S. Becker, Kevin M. Murphy, and Robert Tamura. Human capital, fertility, and
economic growth. The Journal of Political Economy, 98(5):S12–S37, 1990.
Alberto Bisin and Thierry Verdier. On the cultural transmission of preferences for social
status. Journal of Public Economics, 70(1):75 – 97, 1998.
Alberto Bisin and Thierry Verdier. The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics
of preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 97(2):298 – 319, 2001.
Alberto Bisin, Giorgio Topa, and Thierry Verdier. Religious intermarriage and socialization
in the United States. Journal of Political Economy, 112(3):615–664, 2004.
Susan Blackmore. The meme machine. Oxford University Press, 2000.
David G. Blanchflower and Andrew J. Oswald. Well-being over time in Britain and the USA.
Journal of Public Economics, 88(7-8):1359 – 1386, 2004.
Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson. The Origin and Evolution of Cultures. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2005.
John C. Caldwell. Toward a restatement of demographic transition theory. Population and
Development Review, 2(3/4):321–366, 1976.
Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, and Andrew Postlewaite. Social norms, savings behavior,
and growth. Journal of Political Economy, 100(6):1092, 1992.
Richard Dawkins. The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press, 1976.
C. Simon Fan and Oded Stark. Looking at the population problem through the prism
of heterogeneity: Welfare and policy analyses. International Economic Review, 49:799–
835(37), August 2008.
26
Oded Galor and Omer Moav. Natural selection and the origin of economic growth. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 117(4):1133 – 1191, 2002.
Oded Galor and David N. Weil. The gender gap, fertility, and growth. The American
Economic Review, 86(3):374–387, 1996.
Oded Galor and David N. Weil. Population, technology, and growth: From Malthusian
stagnation to the demographic transition and beyond. The American Economic Review,
90(4):806–828, 2000.
L. P. Greksa. Population growth and fertility patterns in an Old Order Amish settlement.
Annals of Human Biology, 29(2):192 – 201, 2002.
Sergei Guriev and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. (Un)Happiness in Transition. The Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 23:143–168(26), 2009.
W. D. Hamilton. The genetical evolution of social behaviour, I. Journal of Theoretical
Biology, 7(1):1 – 16, 1964.
Joseph Henrich and Francisco J. Gil-White. The evolution of prestige: freely conferred
deference as a mechanism for enhancing the benefits of cultural transmission. Evolution
and Human Behavior, 22(3):165 – 196, 2001.
Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan. A stochastic model of mortality, fertility, and human capital invest-
ment. Journal of Development Economics, 70:103–118(16), 2003.
Hans-Peter Kohler, Francesco C. Billari, and Jose Antonio Ortega. The emergence of lowest-
low fertility in Europe during the 1990s. Population and Development Review, 28(4):
641–680, 2002.
Eliana La Ferrara, Alberto Chong, and Suzanne Duryea. Soap operas and fertility: Evidence
from Brazil. RES Working Papers 4573, Inter-American Development Bank, Research
Department, June 2008.
Kaivan Munshi and Jacques Myaux. Social norms and the fertility transition. Journal of
Development Economics, 80(1):1 – 38, 2006.
Lesley Newson, Tom Postmes, S.E.G. Lea, Paul Webley, Peter J. Richerson, and Richard
McElreath. Influences on communication about reproduction: the cultural evolution of
low fertility. Evolution and Human Behavior, 28(3):199 – 210, 2007.
27
Vasily Peskov. Lost in the Taiga: One Russian Family’s Fifty-Year Struggle for Survival and
Religious Freedom in the Siberian Wilderness. Doubleday, 1994.
Arthur J. Robson. Status, the distribution of wealth, private and social attitudes to risk.
Econometrica, 60(4):837–857, 1992.
Arthur J. Robson. The biological basis of economic behavior. Journal of Economic Literature,
39(1):11–33, 2001.
Robert Tamura. Human capital and economic development. Journal of Development Eco-
nomics, 79(1):26 – 72, 2006.
World Values Survey 1981-2008. World Values Survey Association, official aggregate
v.20090901 edition, 2009.
28
A Derivation of demand for ideas
Maximization of (2) subject to (3) over all learning intensities y(i, j) is equivalent to the
maximization of the following Lagrangian:
max
y(i,j),∀i∈{N(j)∪C−1(j)}
{
q(j)− λ(j)
[
x(j)− y(C−1(j), j)−
∫
i∈N(j)
y(i, j)τdi
]}
(31)
where q(j) is defined in (2), and λ(j) is the Lagrange multiplier. Maximization with respect
to an arbitrary y(i, j) yields
q(j)
1
σ−1y(i, j)−
1
σ q(i)
σ−1
σ − λ(j)τ I(j /∈C(i)) = 0 (32)
Solving for y(i, j) yields:
y(i, j) = K(j)q(i)σ−1τ−σI(j /∈C(i)) (33)
where K(j) is some positive person-specific constant. We can now substitute (33) into (3)
to obtain
K(j)q(C−1(j))σ−1 +
∫
i∈N(j)
K(j)
(
q(i)
τ
)σ−1
di = x(j) (34)
By using the definition of the learning environment (5), we can simplify the above formula
to K(j)E(j) = x(j), or K(j) = x(j)
E(j)
. By substituting the latter expression into (33), we end
up with the optimal learning intensities presented in (6).
B Proof of Lemma 1
Throughout the proof, the function arguments x and N are held fixed and are suppressed
in the presentation.
Define a function W (z) such that (cf.(14))
Wz(z) = νz
−(σ−2)Uz(z) = z−(σ−2)B(z)F (z) +K (35)
where K is a positive constant. By definition, Wz has the same sign as Uz for all z > 0,
and therefore a point z > 0 is a local maximum (minimum) of W (z) if and only if it is the
point of a local maximum (minimum) of U(z). We focus on the properties of W (z) in the
following analysis.
By definition of B and F (cf.(12),(15)), W (z) is strictly increasing on (0, z∗], where z∗ is
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defined in (16). Hence, we focus on studying W on z ∈ (z∗, L]. We start by investigating
the sign of the second derivative of W . In equations that follow, all function arguments are
suppressed for brevity.
Wzz = −(σ − 2)z−(σ−1)BF + (σ − 1)z−(σ−1)B(1−B)F
− z−(σ−1)B(σ − 1)L
z
(1−B)− z−(σ−1)B(σ − 1)(L
z
− 1)(σ − 1)B(1−B)
Division of Wzz by Bz
−(σ−1) will change neither its sign nor its zeros. We obtain
B−1zσ−1Wzz = −(σ − 2)F + (σ − 1)(1−B)F
− (σ − 1)L
z
(1−B)− (σ − 1)
(
L
z
− 1
)
(σ − 1)B(1−B) (36)
Next, I add (σ − 1)B + (σ − 1)(1− B)− (σ − 1), which equals zero, to the right-hand side
of (36):
B−1zσ−1Wzz = −(σ − 2)F + (σ − 1)(1−B)F − (σ − 1)
(
L
z
− 1
)
(1−B)
− (σ − 1)B
(
(σ − 1)
(
L
z
− 1
)
(1−B)− 1
)
− (σ − 1)
= −(σ − 2)F + (σ − 1)(1−B)F − (F + 1)− (σ − 1)BF − (σ − 1)
= −2(σ − 1)BF − σ (37)
By definition of z∗, F (z) is strictly negative on (z∗, L] and is decreasing from 0 to −1,
therefore (37) is strictly increasing from −σ to 2(σ− 1)B(L, x,R)− σ on (z∗, L]. Whenever
(17) holds, Wzz is strictly negative for any value of z ∈ (z∗, L); negative second derivative
implies concavity of W and uniqueness of argmaximum, which proves the third statement
of Lemma 1. When (17) does not hold, there exists z∗∗ ∈ (z∗, L) such that Wzz(z) < 0
for z ∈ (z∗, z∗∗) and Wzz(z) > 0 for z ∈ (z∗∗, L). Then, there may be at most one local
maximum of W on z ∈ (z∗, z∗∗); another possible maximum is at z = L. This proves the
first and second statements of Lemma 1.
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C Proof of Proposition 3
C.1 Intragenerational stability
Given that the equilibrium derived in Section 4.2 is interior (i.e. z(x,N) ∈ (0, L)), the best
response function in the vicinity of the equilibrium is found from the condition Uz(z, x,N) =
0. From the implicit function theorem,
dz(x,N)
dx
=
Uzx(x, x,N)
−Uzz(x, x,N)
At the point of utility maximum, the denominator is positive (cf.(21)), and therefore the
sign of dz(x,N)
dx
is equal to the sign of Uzx(x, x,N):
Uzx(x, x,N) = −σ − 1
x
[
N
2
A(N)(1 +N)3
+
N
1 +N
]
< 0 (38)
Therefore, when others change their learning choice, the decision maker responds by changing
his decision in the opposite direction, moving the system towards the initial equilibrium.
C.2 Intergenerational stability
Throughout most of the paper, it is assumed that learning environments are the same for all
members of a given generation. This section emphasizes that the learning environment of
an individual may differ from that of his contemporaries: R(j) = E(j)
Et
6= 1, which will alter
the choices of that individual. To take account of that, I redefine utility as a function of the
learning choice and the relative learning environment (cf.(10)):
U(z,R) =
L− z
ν
Rzσ−1
Rzσ−1 + xσ−1N
+
L− x
ν
Rzσ−1N
xσ−1 + xσ−1N
(39)
The learning choice of others x is assumed to be at the equilibrium characterized in Propo-
sition 2. We denote by z(R) the optimal learning choice of the decision maker: z(R) =
arg maxz U(z,R). From the definition of x (cf.(18)), it follows that z(1) = x.
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With new notations, the relative learning environment of children of j is (cf.(9))
R(R(j)) ≡ R(C(j)) = E(C(j))
Et+1
=
E(j)z(R(j))σ−1 +NEt
(
x
τ
)σ−1
Etx
σ−1 +NEt
(
x
τ
)σ−1
=
R(j)
(
z(R(j))
x
)σ−1
1 +Nτ−(σ−1)
+
Nτ−(σ−1)
1 +Nτ−(σ−1)
(40)
From (40), it follows directly that R(1) = 1. By differentiating (40) with respect to R, we
obtain
dR(1)
dR
=
1 + (σ − 1) zR(1)
x
1 +Nτ−(σ−1)
=
1 + UzR(x,1)− x
σ−1Uzz(x,1)
1 +Nτ
(41)
It can be shown that UzR(x, 1) =
N
2
(1+N)3A(N)
> 0 and therefore dR(1)
dR
> 0. To prove intergen-
erational stability, it is sufficient to prove that dR(1)
dR
< 1. Indeed, we have that
UzR(x, 1)
− x
σ−1Uzz(x, 1)
=
N
(1 +N)
(
N + 2+N
σ−1
) (42)
Intergenerational stability holds if (42) is strictly less than Nτ , or
1
τ
− (1 +N)
(
N +
2 +N
σ − 1
)
< 0 (43)
Although (43) does not hold for all values of τ , N and σ, it can be shown that it does hold
for any τ ≥ 1 if (20) holds. In other words, if the symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists,
it is intergenerationally stable.
32
Table 1: The Observed Effect of Life Satisfaction on Desired Family Size
Ordered Probit Regression
Dependent variable: ideal number of children
World Africa America Asia Europe Pacific
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Life satisfaction -0.0027** 0.0055** 0.0109** 0.0110** -0.0195** 0.0143** 0.0076** 0.0205** 0.0126
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0084)
Age 0.0100** 0.0100** 0.0127** 0.0118** 0.0151** 0.0108** 0.0063**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0009)
Education dummies Yes Yes
Income decile dum-
mies
Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-wave interac-
tion dummies
Yes
Observations 165983 165983 126558 126558 21879 33527 47830 45155 4787
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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